Canadian Medical Tourism: Expanding Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks for American Healthcare Providers by Cochrane, R. Gregory & Corbett, Alicia
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2017
Canadian Medical Tourism: Expanding
Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks for
American Healthcare Providers
R. Gregory Cochrane
UC Hastings College of the Law, cochrang@uchastings.edu
Alicia Corbett
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
R. Gregory Cochrane and Alicia Corbett, Canadian Medical Tourism: Expanding Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks for American
Healthcare Providers, 57 Jurimetrics 211 (2017).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1517
 
WINTER 2017 211 
 
 
CANADIAN MEDICAL TOURISM:  
EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES  
AND REDUCING LEGAL RISKS  
FOR AMERICAN HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS  
 
R. Gregory Cochran 
Alicia Corbett 
 
ABSTRACT: Medical tourism, growing worldwide, includes Canadians coming 
to the United States for medical treatment. For U.S. healthcare providers to take 
advantage of the potential economic benefits of cash-paying Canadian medical 
tourists, they must comply with U.S. federal and state laws governing fraud and 
abuse, including the federal Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), and 
state-level analogs. These laws may restrict the ability of U.S. healthcare 
providers to compensate foreign medical tourism brokers, who play an 
important role in the growth of medical tourism by providing patients with 
assistance arranging travel and medical services. Using a hypothetical arrange-
ment among U.S. healthcare providers and a Canadian medical practice that not 
only provides the typical broker services, but also serves to identify appropriate 
cases for referral from a medical perspective, this article demonstrates how to 
reduce or even eliminate potential fraud and abuse liability, while improving the 
quality of the experience for both patients and U.S. providers.  
 
CITATION: R. Gregory Cochran and Alicia Corbett, Canadian Medical Tourism: 
Expanding Opportunities and Reducing Legal Risks for American Healthcare Providers, 
57 Jurimetrics J. 211–237 (2017). 
 
 Medical tourism has existed for millennia. In ancient times, people traveled 
to hot springs for healing.1 In recent decades, increasing numbers of medical 
tourists from countries in the developed world—including the United States—
have been traveling to numerous developing nations, such as Mexico, Thailand, 
and India, seeking lower cost medical procedures and treatments as well as 
procedures that may not be readily available or even legal in travelers’ home 
                                                                                                                               
 Lecturer in Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law; Associate Director, 
Health Policy and Law Degree Program, UC San Francisco/UC Hastings Consortium on Law, 
Science & Health Policy. 
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 1. Kate Pickert, A Brief History of Medical Tourism, TIME (Nov. 25, 2008), http://content. 
time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1861919,00.html. 
Cochran & Corbett 
 
 
212 57 JURIMETRICS 
nations.2 The literature about the legal issues arising from medical tourism to 
the developing world is extensive.3  
 Yet, there is also a long history of medical travel to developed nations, in-
cluding the United States. Premier providers, such as Cleveland Clinic and 
Mayo Clinic, have consistently attracted wealthier residents of other countries, 
particularly those from other nations in the Americas,4 who are drawn to the 
world-class medicine provided at these institutions, many of which specifically 
devote personnel to assisting international patients with arranging every aspect 
of their care and treatment, even travel arrangements.5 Given the geographic 
proximity, it is not surprising that some Canadians are among those seeking 
medical care in the United States. 
 Despite generally higher prices in the United States than in many other na-
tions, a number of Canadians have traveled to the United States for medical care 
in recent years,6 ostensibly motivated by lengthy wait times for nonemergency 
medical procedures and diagnostic tests in the Canadian national healthcare 
system.7 Medical tourism brokers or facilitators, which are typically “lay” 
owned or operated,8 whether located in Canada or elsewhere, offer medical tour-
ists the gamut of services, ranging from solely travel package deals to those that 
include identifying physicians and hospitals and brokering all aspects of both 
                                                                                                                               
 2. See id.; NEIL LUNT ET AL., MEDICAL TOURISM: TREATMENTS, MARKETS AND HEALTH 
SYSTEM IMPLICATIONS: A SCOPING REVIEW 14 (2011), https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/ 
48723982.pdf (Estimates of the numbers of medical tourists worldwide range from 60,000–85,000 
to 50 million individuals.); Kai Ruggeri et al., Evidence on Global Medical Travel, 93 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 785, 785–86, 786 tbl.1 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.14.146027 (noting the 
shortcomings of available data on medical travelers worldwide); I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting 
Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
1467, 1477 (2010) (discussing types of medical tourism). 
 3. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2; Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena 
in a Flat World: Medical Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421 (2007). 
 4. Mayo Clinic has dedicated representative offices in Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Guate-
mala, and Mexico. Representative Offices, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/departments-
centers/international/representative-offices [https://perma.cc/3YWS-XNRF] (last visited Jan. 19, 
2017). 
 5. See, e.g., International Services, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/departments-
centers/international [https://perma.cc/HH4T-NHVB] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017); International 
Patient Services, CLEV. CLINIC, http://my.clevelandclinic.org/patients-visitors/international [https:// 
perma.cc/7EV4-X36A] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).  
 6. While the precise number of Canadians coming to the United States is uncertain, the number 
is a subset of the 52,000 Canadians estimated to have traveled in 2014 to all other countries, up from 
41,838 in 2013. See BACCHUS BARUA & FEIXUE REN, LEAVING CANADA FOR MEDICAL CARE, 
2015, FRASER RESEARCH BULLETIN 4 (2015), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/ 
sites/default/files/leaving-canada-for-medical-care-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8AY-T9AT]. 
 7. Catherine Regis et al., Implementing Medical Travel in the Canadian Health Care System: 
Considerations for Policy Makers, 20 HEALTH L.J. 73, 74, 83–84 (2013); Bacchus Barua, Waiting 
Your Turn: Wait Times for Health Care in Canada, 2015 Report, FRASER INST. (Dec. 8, 2015), 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/waiting-your-turn-wait-times-for-health-care-in-canada-2015-
report (Canadians waited an average of “10.4 weeks for a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan” 
in 2015.). 
 8. We use the terms lay owned or lay operated to mean that the entity is not owned or operated 
by licensed healthcare professionals or healthcare entities. 
 Canadian Medical Tourism 
 
 
WINTER 2017 213 
the medical and the travel arrangements.9 U.S. providers have not generally em-
braced the notion of receiving healthcare business from other countries in the 
context of commercially brokered packages and deals.  
 Furthermore, American healthcare providers are understandably sensitive 
to the potential penalties associated with noncompliance with the myriad anti-
kickback, self-referral, and fee-splitting laws at both the federal and state 
levels.10 As such, they may feel uncertain about the legality of expanding their 
business dealings to include physicians and other entities outside the United 
States, which would necessarily result in the need to reevaluate their existing 
compliance policies and programs with input from legal counsel. Indeed, while 
foreign-based brokers are likely to escape the grip of U.S. federal and state laws 
that brokered arrangements might implicate, U.S.-based physicians, hospitals, 
and other providers involved in such arrangements do not escape this risk and 
thus may be deterred from participating.  
 Aside from legal risk, U.S. providers are likely also to be concerned with 
limits on their financial return and inflexibility about the nature and structure of 
such referral arrangements. Perceived adverse impacts of inbound medical 
tourism on access to, and allocation of, limited healthcare resources in the des-
tination nation raise additional concerns.11 However, as discussed below, med-
ical tourism to the United States does not necessarily adversely impact 
Americans’ access to healthcare services and may indeed serve to increase ac-
cess to certain technologies, procedures, and treatments. Even more importantly, 
medical tourism can increase revenues to U.S. physicians and hospitals as well 
as their local economies, with minimal potential for legal liability under U.S. 
fraud and abuse laws, provided the parties agree to a few relatively straight-
forward parameters. 
 To support our view of the positive impact of medical tourism with limited 
concerns for adverse U.S. medical regulatory repercussions, we begin by exam-
ining briefly the evolution of Canadian medical tourism to the United States 
(referred to herein as Inbound Medical Tourism) and the role of Canadian med-
ical tourism brokers. We then set forth a hypothetical, mutually beneficial In-
bound Medical Tourism arrangement among a U.S. medical group, a U.S. 
hospital, and a Canadian primary care physician practice that acts as the medical 
tourism broker, in lieu of utilizing a lay medical tourism broker, the reasons for 
which will unfold during our analysis.  
                                                                                                                               
 9. See, e.g., Kail Penney et al., Risk Communication and Informed Consent in the Medical 
Tourism Industry: A Thematic Content Analysis of Canadian Broker Websites, 12 BMC MED.  
ETHICS, art. no. 17, 2011, at 1, 2; Lydia Gan & James Frederick, Medical Tourism Facilitators: 
Patterns of Service Differentiation, 17 J. VACATION MARKETING 165, 170 (2011). 
 10. In the authors’ opinion, based on their experience as practicing healthcare attorneys, and 
Dr. Cochran’s experience as a practicing physician.  
 11. See, e.g., Y.Y. Brandon Chen & Colleen M. Flood, Medical Tourism’s Impact on Health 
Care Equity and Access in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Making the Case for Regulation, 
41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286 (2013); I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and 
Global Justice, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011); Laura Hopkins et al., Medical Tourism Today: What Is 
the State of Existing Knowledge?, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 185, 192–94 (2010); Regis et al., supra 
note 7, at 99–102. 
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 After identifying the economic benefits that increased medical tourism may 
confer on the U.S. healthcare market and local economies, we turn to the appli-
cable U.S. legal impediments that such arrangements may implicate. We deter-
mine that, while our hypothetical arrangement will not run afoul of the U.S. 
federal Stark Law and federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), certain state-level 
anti-kickback and fee-splitting prohibitions impose the most substantial of the 
potential legal impediments on such Inbound Medical Tourism arrangements. 
Given these state restrictions, we suggest ways to structure these transactions in 
a manner designed to minimize this risk. We ultimately show that replacing the 
lay medical tourism broker with a Canadian primary care medical practice—
serving as both the clearinghouse for identifying patients and as the broker for 
negotiating the arrangements—is critical for legal compliance purposes. Re-
placing the for-profit, lay-owned entity with a medical practice that does not 
seek to profit from the arrangement12 serves critically to minimize inappropriate 
referrals and lowers the risk to the American providers under applicable legal 
impediments. Despite the ability to structure these arrangements to minimize 
risk under state laws, we also propose changes to the applicable laws to further 
eliminate risk from Inbound Medical Tourism ventures, without compromising 
the patient-protection goals of existing laws.  
I. INBOUND MEDICAL TOURISM FROM CANADA 
 For a variety of reasons Canadian medical tourists look to other countries 
for care, in spite of essentially free universal publicly funded medical coverage 
and in spite of the availability of private insurance that some Canadians use to 
augment the public coverage provided through the country’s Medicare pro-
gram.13 Multiple researchers have speculated that the often lengthy wait times 
to receive many nonemergency procedures, ranging from MRIs to hip replace-
ments, are a principal motivating factor for Canadian medical tourism.14 The 
                                                                                                                               
 12. The Canadian practice in our hypothetical does not desire to profit directly from providing 
the services that would typically be provided by the for-profit broker; however, to the extent the 
practice’s business for professional medical services grows because of its experience in medical 
tourism, the practice may profit indirectly.  
 13. Canadians do not pay out of pocket for Medicare-covered services, but only about 70 
percent of financing for healthcare in Canada comes from Medicare and 30 percent comes from 
nonpublic, privately funded, or insurance-reimbursed sources. Karen Born & Andreas Laupacis, 
Public and Private Payment for Health Care in Canada, HEALTHY DEBATE (July 20, 2011), 
http://healthydebate.ca/2011/07/topic/cost-of-care/publicprivate. For example, Medicare does not 
pay for certain services, which may be complementary (meeting costs not covered by the public 
system such as the cost of prescription medicines, dental treatments, and copayments) or supple-
mentary (adding more choice of provider or providing faster access to care). Id. Canadians must pay 
for those services out-of-pocket or through supplemental, private insurance. Id.; see Regis et al., 
supra note 7, at 74. The article explains that in a complex legal decision in 2005, the Supreme Court 
of Canada ruled that in some circumstances private insurance could be used to “jump the queue” for 
medically necessary Medicare-covered services. Id.  
 14. See, e.g., Steven J. Katz et al., Phantoms in the Snow: Canadians’ Use of Health Care 
Services in the United States, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 19, 21–22 (2002); Milan Korcok, Excess Demand 
Meets Excess Supply as Referral Companies Link Canadian Patients, US Hospitals, 157 CANADIAN 
MED. ASS’N J. 767 (1997); Regis et al., supra note 7, at 74–75; Barua, supra note 7 (“[A]ssuming 
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expense of obtaining noncovered procedures, such as cosmetic and dental pro-
cedures, from private Canadian providers can also prompt some Canadians to 
seek care abroad.15 Further, certain cutting-edge or experimental procedures, 
such as Gamma Knife radiation and proton beam cancer treatments, are more 
widely available in the United States than in Canada,16 where provincial gov-
ernments are sometimes unable financially to make the substantial investments 
in medical equipment needed to provide these services.17  
 While Canadians also travel to more distant destinations, including India 
and Thailand, given the opportunity and financial means, some Canadians prefer 
to stay closer to home and to seek care from their English-speaking neighbor 
with a reputation for a high standard of medical quality.18 A 2008 McKinsey 
study found that 40 percent of worldwide medical tourists traveled to obtain 
advanced medical technologies, with most patients reporting this travel motiva-
tion obtaining care in the United States.19 Mayo Clinic estimated that 18–20 
percent of its roughly 8200 annual international patient registrations came from 
Canada in the late 1990s.20  
 Estimates of the numbers of Canadians seeking medical care in the United 
States and other countries are not readily available. One study found only 2 per-
cent of Canadian survey participants had previously traveled abroad to receive 
medical care, although 20 percent indicated they would consider traveling 
abroad for self-funded medical services.21 Given the relatively high cost of U.S. 
medical services and the inability of lower-income Canadians to afford them, it 
                                                                                                                               
that each person waits for only one procedure, 2.5% of Canadians are waiting for treatment in 
2015.”). 
 15. Regis et al., supra note 7, at 86. 
 16. Katz et al., supra note 14, at 22. 
 17. See, e.g., Donors Make It Happen: World Leading Gamma Knife Technology Is Coming 
to Edmonton Thanks to Donor Support, UNIV. HOSP. FOUND., https://www.universityhospital 
foundation.ab.ca/braincentre/gamma-knife (last visited Jan. 19, 2017) (noting private donations 
were needed to establish Gamma Knife procedure availability in Edmonton); Gamma Knife Surgery, 
WINNIPEG REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY, http://www.wrha.mb.ca/prog/surgery/gamma_ knife/ 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2017) (asserting that Winnipeg has “Canada’s first and only [G]amma [K]nife 
and GKS program”).  
 18. Valorie A. Crooks et al., What Is Known about the Patient’s Experience of Medical 
Tourism? A Scoping Review, 10 BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES., art. no. 266, 2010, at 1, 5–6 (“The most 
frequently discussed pull factor [in the literature] was quality.”); see also Rory Johnston et al., “I 
Didn’t Even Know What I Was Looking for”: A Qualitative Study of the Decision-Making Processes 
of Canadian Medical Tourists, 8 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, art. no. 23, 2012, at 1, 6 fig.1 (Of 
study participants, the United States was the second most popular destination country for Canadian 
medical tourists.). 
 19. Tilman Ehrbeck et al., Mapping the Market for Medical Travel, MCKINSEY Q., Autumn 
2008, at 80. 
 20. Korcok, supra note 14, at 769. Mayo Clinic now has numerous facilities outside the United 
States (although none are in Canada), which would reduce the need for patients from those countries 
to travel to the United States for care. 
 21. LISA PURDY & MARK FAM, DELOITTE, EVOLVING MEDICAL TOURISM IN CANADA: 
EXPLORING A NEW FRONTIER IN HEALTH CARE 6, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ 
ca/Documents/life-sciences-health-care/ca-en-health-care-life-sciences-evolving-medical-tourism-
exploring-a-new-frontier.pdf.  
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is not surprising that most Canadian medical tourists obtaining U.S. care are 
middle-aged (40-65) and have higher levels of income.22 
 Notwithstanding the inconvenience and cost, Canadian medical tourism has 
grown significantly in the past several years.23 For example, Ontario reported a 
450 percent increase from 2001 to 2008 in the number of provincial citizens 
being reimbursed for medical treatment abroad, much of it in the United States.24 
At least a portion of the growth in Canadian medical tourism overall can be 
attributed to medical tourism brokers or facilitators, companies that connect 
medical tourists with providers abroad, assist with scheduling and coordinating 
pretreatment testing and transferring medical records, making travel arrange-
ments, and sometimes arranging follow-up care back home in Canada.25  
 Some Canadian facilitators also negotiate rates with U.S. providers, who 
may be willing to offer discounted fees that are still higher than many of their 
contracted rates with American health plans and insurance companies.26 U.S. 
providers also may prefer to do business with these up-front cash-paying pa-
tients over insurance companies that may not pay for weeks or months.  
 While we have only limited empirical data about the prevalence of medical 
tourism brokers in Canada, one study estimated that approximately 50 medical 
tourism companies operated in Canada between 2006 and 2011, with seven 
providing assistance for travelers to the United States.27 Another study noted 
that, of the ten medical tourism companies it identified, each worked with 1030 
to 1335 clients per year.28 Canadian medical tourism brokers can provide an 
invaluable service in a country that does not encourage, much less facilitate, 
patients to seek out medical tourism services. Many surveyed Canadian medical 
tourism patients noted their inability to even know what questions to ask when 
considering medical tourism, increasing their reliance on information from bro-
kers.29 Thus brokers can alleviate concerns and help patients locate their desired 
medical care, and the valuable functions they perform are an important compo-
nent of Inbound Medical Tourism.  
 Neither the United States nor Canada directly regulates the medical tourism 
industry, despite calls to do so from multiple commentators.30 One concern is 
                                                                                                                               
 22. See Rory Johnston et al., An Industry Perspective on Canadian Patients’ Involvement in 
Medical Tourism: Implications for Public Health, 11 BMC PUB. HEALTH, art. no. 416, 2011, at 1, 4. 
 23. Id. at 1. 
 24. Hopkins et al., supra note 11, at 188. Provincial governments may provide reimbursement 
when Canadian citizens receive certain forms of care abroad. However, the focus of this article is 
on medical tourism funded directly by the patients. 
 25. See Johnston et al., supra note 18, at 2. See generally Leigh Turner, Canadian Medical 
Tourism Companies That Have Exited the Marketplace: Content Analysis of Websites Used to 
Market Transnational Medical Travel, 7 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, art. no. 40, 2011, at 1 (dis-
cussing the expansion of the medical travel industry and the role of facilitating companies). 
 26. Korcok, supra note 14, at 768. 
 27. See Turner, supra note 25, at 1, 5. 
 28. Johnston et al., supra note 22, at 4. 
 29. See Johnston et al., supra note 18, at 8, 10.  
 30. See, e.g., Leigh Turner, Quality in Health Care and Globalization of Health Services: 
Accreditation and Regulatory Oversight of Medical Tourism Companies, 23 INT. J. QUAL. HEALTH 
CARE 1, 2 (2011); Roy G. Spece, Jr. Medical Tourism: Protecting Patients from Conflicts of Interest 
in Broker’s Fees Paid by Foreign Providers, VI J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1 (2010); M. Neil 
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that the fees that foreign medical providers pay to lay-owned brokers may, with-
out substantial safeguards, inappropriately encourage referrals and may be le-
gally prohibited in the United States, as we discuss further below. One author 
estimated that these fees range from 8 to 15 percent of the total cost of care for 
the patient referred by the broker.31  
 While in some cases the patient pays the broker a comprehensive fee cov-
ering all care from which the broker takes its fee before passing along payments 
to medical providers, in other cases the patient may pay the medical provider(s) 
directly who then remit a fee to the broker.32 Each of these types of arrangements 
raises potentially differing legal risks under U.S. laws and regulations, making 
the structure of medical tourism arrangements critically important for mini-
mizing the potential for legal liability. Indeed, our hypothetical, presented in the 
next Part, does not include a medical tourism broker that is owned and operated 
by lay persons. Rather, we see great utility from a practical perspective, and a 
reduction of the legal risk, in a model under which the referring physician prac-
tice provides or arranges for the services that would otherwise have been pro-
vided by a lay broker. 
II. HYPOTHETICAL INBOUND  
MEDICAL TOURISM ARRANGEMENT 
 To better illustrate the potential U.S. legal impediments to Inbound Medical 
Tourism, we set forth a hypothetical arrangement among Canadian patients, a 
Canadian medical practice in lieu of a lay-owned broker, and U.S. medical pro-
viders (a large surgical practice and a hospital).  
 Dr. Betsy Kim, a Los Angeles-based general surgeon, leads a highly re-
garded fifteen-physician surgical medical group, called City of Angels Surgical 
Specialists, Inc. (CASS), which includes other general surgeons, as well as those 
specializing in organ transplantation, plastics and reconstructive surgery, and 
cardiac and orthopedic surgery. All the CASS surgeons are on the medical staff 
of, and hold academic appointments and leadership positions at, the prestigious 
University of Los Angeles Medical Center (ULAMC). CASS enjoys a solid rep-
utation and an extensive network of referring colleagues.  
 Originally from Toronto, Canada, Betsy recently visited her extended 
family there. Her cousin Dave Kim, a family practitioner in a small practice on 
the outskirts of Toronto called Ontario Family Physicians (OFP), had antici-
pated Betsy’s visit because he wanted to get her take on a new business idea. 
Dave told Betsy that his patients regularly need medically necessary, nonemer-
gency surgical and endoscopic services, particularly joint replacement, cardiac, 
gastroenterological, and neurosurgical procedures, but because of the relative 
                                                                                                                               
Browne et al., American Medical Tourism: Regulating a Cure that Can Damage Consumer Health, 
25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 319, 324 (2013). 
 31. Spece, supra note 30, at 5. 
 32. See id. at 6, 16 (“usually foreign hospitals . . . pay broker’s fees”); Mark S. Kopson. 
Medical Tourism: Implications for Providers and Plans. 3:2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 147 (2010) 
(“[I]n many cases, the provider pays the facilitator a percentage of the provider’s fee for the medical 
care provided to the facilitator’s customer.”). 
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shortage of surgeons and hospitals in Canada’s government-funded, single-
payor system, patients regularly find themselves on long waitlists for most 
nonemergency procedures. Some opt to travel abroad at their own expense, even 
after paying taxes to the Canadian system, often to New York and to other north-
eastern states, but to other countries as well. The waitlists have led to worsening 
of painful and debilitating conditions and complications that Dave believes 
could have been prevented with earlier intervention.  
 Aside from wanting faster service, Dave believes that Canadians go to the 
United States because medical costs in America, at least for some procedures, 
have come down in recent years compared to those in other developed-nation 
destinations such as the United Kingdom.33 Dave also believes that his patients 
are attracted to U.S. hospitals that seem increasingly to have recognized the 
medical tourism market and that are willing to negotiate their rates. While the 
United States is still not usually the least costly option, particularly when com-
pared to less developed-nation destinations, and indeed remains the most expen-
sive option for many procedures, Dave believes that many Canadians trust the 
U.S. healthcare system and appreciate the common language, culture, and geo-
graphic proximity. Some U.S. hospitals and medical centers that have been spe-
cifically marketing their services to Canadians offer all-inclusive packages that 
cover the entire cost of the procedure, including physician, hospital and ancillary 
services, and in some cases, resources to make travel arrangements.34  
 Alternatively, Dave explained that most of his patients have engaged the 
services of Canadian-based medical tourism brokers who organize every aspect 
of the journey abroad, including travel arrangements, and identify and schedule 
evaluations with the surgeons, negotiating prices and packages with travel 
agents, surgeons, anesthesiologists and hospitals.  
 Some of Dave’s less wealthy patients have sought services in countries with 
substantially lower costs than those in the United States, and while most have 
been satisfied, some of them reported terrible experiences, including visa and 
entry-related problems, dangerously constructed and shoddily run hospitals, and 
questionably competent physicians and nurses. Some of Dave’s patients even 
reported having been discharged with undiagnosed or untreated complications, 
some of whom end up in Canadian hospitals, sicker than they had been before 
the journey. 
                                                                                                                               
 33. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS 2015 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: VARIATION 
IN MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL PRICES BY COUNTRY (2015), http://static1.squarespace. 
com/static/518a3cfee4b0a77d03a62c98/t/57d3ca9529687f1a257e9e26/1473497751062/2015+Com
parative+Price+Report+09.09.16.pdf (showing U.K. average prices substantially higher than those in 
the United States for diagnostic angiograms and diagnostic colonoscopies).  
 34. See Andrea Downing Peck, Hospitals in New York State and Throughout the United States 
Are Advertising to Attract the Growing Number of Medial Tourists from Canada, DARK DAILY 
LABORATORY & PATHOLOGY NEWS (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.darkdaily.com/hospitals-in-new-
york-state-and-throughout-the-united-states-are-advertising-to-attract-the-growing-number-of-
medical-tourists-from-canada-127#axzz4NwBgBvkP; see also Cleveland Clinic and Mayo Clinic 
Compete for Medical Tourists, INT’L MED. TRAVEL J., (Nov. 10, 2010), https://www.imtj.com/ 
news/cleveland-clinic-and-mayo-clinic-compete-medical-tourists/ (discussing Middle Eastern med-
ical tourists).  
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 Dave expressed concern that many patients sought medical tourism services 
without consulting with him or another physician and relied entirely on the lay 
medical tourism brokers and agencies which he views as nothing more than glo-
rified travel agencies. Dave, too, is bothered that medical tourism does not ap-
pear to be an option for most of his less well-off patients. He believes that he 
could address those issues and otherwise make U.S. services more available to 
his patients by setting up an arrangement with reputable American providers 
with favorably discounted negotiated rates. Dave and his colleagues would iden-
tify patients and broker the arrangements themselves with the foreign surgeons 
and hospitals and eliminate the need for a third-party, lay-owned broker. OFP 
would either engage administrative staff to assist with the travel arrangements 
or subcontract that out to a travel agency. Dave asked whether Betsy and her 
partners would be interested in participating in such a venture, which he pitched 
as a source for business through the new revenue stream from Dave’s and his 
colleague’s referrals, including an expanded referral base from OFP and the 
practice’s other colleagues in Toronto. 
 Betsy’s only concern was whether Dave’s practice saw enough potential 
medical tourists to justify the cost of setting up a business arrangement. Dave 
assured Betsy that, not only does his practice include numerous potential med-
ical tourists, but that he learned in discussions with his network of physician 
colleagues that many of them face similar issues and would be interested in re-
ferring their patients to OFP for that specific service. Dave said, too, that many 
of his patients expressed concerns about using lay brokers for this type of travel 
and have said that they would much prefer for these arrangements to be made 
by their physicians. Acknowledging, as well, that travel arrangements are a bit 
outside the scope of a primary care practice, Dave feels that such services are 
directly related to ensuring quality care for his patients and that his colleagues 
believed that the expense of hiring or contracting with travel specialists, for 
whose services the patients would pay, would not adversely affect their bottom 
line or their reputation as clinicians.  
 Betsy told Dave that she was very excited about the proposed venture and 
believed that her colleagues would be too. She felt that ULAMC would also be 
quite interested in a potential new service line. Dave suggested that once Betsy’s 
colleagues gave her the thumbs up, they start by meeting and establishing rela-
tionships with CASS and ULAMC, hopefully leading to agreements between 
and among them that set forth the terms and conditions of their respective ser-
vices and fees, including mutually agreed to protocols for identifying and 
screening patients and matching them to the appropriate providers. As such, 
Dave’s practice, rather than a lay-owned broker, would serve as the broker. 
Dave hopes that the business would at least cover his practice’s costs, including 
compensation for his time spent managing the venture, but he explained to Betsy 
that his main motivator in pursuing the arrangement would be to help his pa-
tients get timely, high-quality surgery.  
 Betsy was very enthusiastic about her cousin’s idea and thought that her 
partners and the ULAMC administration would be too. She explained to Dave 
that almost all of CASS’s and ULAMC’s patients’ health plans and insurance 
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companies, particularly Medicare and Medicaid, pay the group and the hospital 
substantially less than their usual and customary fees, and that they would thus 
welcome the opportunity to serve privately paying patients, even at a discount, 
especially if the patients were required to pay for the services in advance. 
 Dave informed Betsy that he would prefer not to collect money from these 
patients because that would be a substantial additional burden on his small prac-
tice; thus, he proposed that patients would pay CASS directly one price for the 
full package of services, and CASS, which has much more sophisticated systems 
and expertise, would then allocate and remit the money to ULAMC for its ser-
vices and the administrative fee to OFP for the administrative costs in paying its 
staff and arranging travel services.  
III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS  
TO INBOUND MEDICAL TOURISM  
 Before discussing the legal issues inherent in an arrangement like the one 
in our hypothetical, we explain how such arrangements can not only financially 
benefit the U.S. medical providers, but also can benefit the local economies 
where the participating U.S. providers are located. We also briefly assess the 
potential drawbacks inherent in Inbound Medical Tourism, including potential 
harms to the U.S. population, concluding that the potential benefits outweigh 
the potential risks from an arrangement such as that in our hypothetical.  
A. Potential Benefits of Inbound Medical Tourism to  
the United States 
 Using appropriately structured models, U.S. providers benefit from in-
creasing medical tourism to their facilities and communities. Canadian medical 
tourists pay the U.S. providers in advance for care out-of-pocket, improving 
cash flow and revenue, in some cases offsetting declining revenues from the 
providers’ other sources, including private insurance programs and Medicare 
and Medicaid. One study estimated the value of inbound medical tourism in 
2007 from all countries to be between $491 million35 and $1.2 billion, resulting 
from between approximately 43,000 and 103,000 foreigners seeking medical 
care in the United States.36 Thailand generated approximately $850 million in 
additional revenue from treating an estimated 900,000 medical tourists in 
2008.37 Additional revenues from medical tourists could help to offset both un-
reimbursed emergency medical care provided by CASS and ULAMC, as well 
as the lower revenue they receive from other payors, particularly lower-paying 
government programs.  
 Medical tourists’ expenditures on travel confer another economic benefit 
on the United States, particularly on the local area where the services are pro-
vided, especially when medical tourists bring companions or when they remain 
                                                                                                                               
 35. All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.  
 36. Tricia J. Johnson & Andrew N. Garman, Impact of Medical Travel on Imports and Exports 
of Medical Services, 98 HEALTH POL’Y 171, 176 (2010). 
 37. Hopkins et al., supra note 11, at 192. 
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in the United States for some time to recover before returning home. These ad-
ditional expenditures could as much as double the impact on the U.S. economy 
from inbound medical tourism.38 When medical tourism-related expenditures 
are included, Thailand generated up to $1.35 billion from medical tourism in 
2007.39 
 Commentators have touted medical tourism’s positive economic impact on 
developing nations,40 an impact which should correlate to Inbound Medical 
Tourism to the United States as well, perhaps even more strongly than in a de-
veloping nation such as India or Thailand. Medical tourism encourages medical 
facilities to invest in state-of-the-art medical equipment to attract medical tour-
ists, equipment which is then at least potentially more readily available to the 
providing country’s citizens.41 The increased revenue from medical tourism 
contributes to the demand for, and thus assists the country in retaining, all levels 
of skilled healthcare professionals, from highly trained physician specialists to 
ancillary services technicians.42  
 Medical tourism may also reduce the excess capacity for some medical ser-
vices in the United States. Excess capacity and underutilization may reduce re-
covery from investments in expensive equipment such as proton-beam machines 
and MRIs, thereby discouraging investment and growth.43 Medical tourists 
serve both to absorb some of the excess capacity and to contribute to the return 
on physicians’ and hospitals’ investments in such technology and equipment. 
B. Potential Drawbacks of Inbound Medical Tourism to  
the United States 
 Even if Inbound Medical Tourism to the United States helps to expand the 
market for American healthcare services and economically benefits the United 
States and local healthcare markets as described above, it does so not without at 
least calling into question some potential drawbacks, ethical and otherwise, pre-
dominantly those related to patients’ access to, and the equitable allocation of, 
scarce healthcare resources. The United States historically has struggled, for 
many reasons, with providing its own citizens adequate access to care.44 Com-
pared to other developed nations, the United States has had a high percentage of 
                                                                                                                               
 38. Johnson & Garman, supra note 36, at 176. 
 39. Chen & Flood, supra note 11, at 296. 
 40. See, e.g., Regis et al., supra note 7, at 102; Hopkins et al., supra note 11, at 191–92.  
 41. Rory Johnston et al., What Is Known About the Effects of Medical Tourism in Destination 
and Departure Countries? A Scoping Review, 9 INT’L J. EQUITY HEALTH 24, 30 (2010). 
 42. Regis et al., supra note 7, at 99. 
 43. See Robert S. Kaplan & Michael E. Porter, How to Solve the Cost Crisis in Health Care, 
89 HARV. BUS. REV. 47, 59 (2011).  
 44. KAREN DAVIS ET AL., MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 7 (2014) (“The U.S. fails to achieve 
better health outcomes than the other countries, and . . . the U.S. is last or near last on dimensions 
of access, efficiency, and equity.”); see also Aaron E. Carroll, Why the U.S. Still Trails Many 
Wealthy Nations in Access to Care, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/ 
25/upshot/why-the-us-still-trails-many-wealthy-nations-in-access-to-care.html?_r=0 (Despite beating 
last-place Canada, the United States was second-to-last in patients’ beliefs that they could get a 
same-day or next-day appointment with their provider when sick.).  
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citizens who are uninsured or otherwise unable to pay.45 Of those with accept-
able insurance, many seek procedures for which the resources are limited and 
thus find themselves on the waitlist for such procedures just like Canadians.46 A 
model like the hypothetical described in this article could potentially serve to 
favor Canadians with means by providing them with an opportunity to jump to 
the front of the line. Indeed, a number of commentators believe that medical 
tourism reduces access to healthcare for the destination country’s poor.47 Such 
comments, however, are usually made in the context of countries with already 
dramatic and clear disparities in access to healthcare between the rich and poor. 
In the context of the specific Inbound Medical Tourism model presented in this 
article, such disparities should be less problematic for several reasons.  
 First, as discussed above, Inbound Medical Tourism may in many cases 
create a demand for certain procedures and technology to improve the econ-
omies of scale for implementing such procedures and technology, thus making 
them more available to a larger segment of the region’s population. Certainly, 
while basic economics would seem to predict that CASS and ULAMC will be 
incentivized to show preference for booking OFP patients under very favorable, 
advanced and all-cash payment terms over local patients who pay later at likely 
lower rates,48 the American providers are not likely to displace American 
patients for OFP patients because the differences in amounts collected are not 
likely to be so substantial that CASS and ULAMC will be incentivized to turn 
away U.S. patients in favor of OFP patients. Given that U.S. prices are already 
the highest for most medical tourism services compared to its competition in 
many other countries, CASS’s and ULAMC’s leverage for pricing will be 
limited to their appeal in providing quality, relatively nearby services, in an 
English-speaking environment. As such, the prices they negotiate with OFP are 
not likely to be so substantially below those offered to and collected from their 
U.S. patients. Further, particularly after the enactment of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act in 2010, substantially higher numbers of Americans 
are insured and thus able and willing purchasers to whom providers are less 
likely to deny services because of the provider’s preference for Canadian med-
ical tourists.  
                                                                                                                               
 45. See Social Protection: % of Total Population Covered, OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Index.aspx?QueryId=29856 (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (showing that the U.S. percentage of total 
population covered by public and private health insurance was 90.9 percent in 2015, ranking among 
the very lowest). 
 46. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 21 ex.A (showing that the United States ranked in the 
bottom half (6 out of 11) of countries studied for having waiting time of 4 months or more for 
elective/nonemergency surgery).  
 47. See, e.g., Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 158, 
160 (2002) (Medical tourism threatens to “result in a dual market structure, by creating a higher-
quality, expensive segment that caters to wealthy nationals and foreigners, and a much lower-
quality, resource-constrained segment catering to the poor.”). 
 48. Even with discounted, prenegotiated rates, OFP can still offer rates that are likely to result 
in greater net reimbursement compared to that received on behalf of local patients. Most of these 
local patients pay using government or private insurance, which generally pay less than the doctors’ 
usual and customary fees.  
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 Second, the disparities described above are less likely to arise in a model 
like this because the U.S. providers, such as CASS and ULAMC, are not likely 
to begin turning away patients and alienating their solid local network of referral 
physicians due to the preferred terms associated with the Canadian patients. Ra-
ther than simply turning down patients with moderately less favorable payment 
terms, U.S. providers will likely be just as incentivized to grow their businesses 
to provide more services to all by hiring more surgeons and opening up more 
operating rooms to meet the increased demand from Canadian and U.S. referral 
sources. Therefore, we think that Canadian displacement of U.S. patients should 
not be a material detriment to the proposed model.  
 Even if the model led to displacement of U.S. patients, such a result would 
likely only have a direct effect on the local market where medical tourists seek 
treatment. We would not anticipate huge numbers of medical tourists coming 
into any given local area. Further, any such displacement effect should be tem-
porary and ultimately would be offset by the increase in technology and services 
that will arise out of the greater demand for them, as discussed above.49 Addi-
tionally, notwithstanding any potential temporary displacement, the model will 
favorably impact morbidity and mortality related to delay in treatment for Ca-
nadians. In summary, we would expect that any displacement of American pa-
tients would be relatively insignificant and short-lived, and would have a net 
immediate positive impact on health for the medical tourists and a net longer-
term improvement on health for the local population because of improved access 
to more technology.  
IV. APPLICABLE U.S. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
 With access to and allocation of resources not presenting an insurmountable 
challenge to the proposed medical tourism model, and recognizing that Inbound 
Medical Tourism can provide significant economic benefits to providers and 
their communities, we now examine the legal hurdles that the model implicates 
and conclude that none in the U.S. federal scheme pose an absolute barrier. The 
proposed transactions involve varying degrees of risk under certain U.S. state 
laws, but we will explain how to structure the arrangement to minimize such 
risks.50 
 We provide a diagram of the pertinent contractual relationships among the 
various parties under the model proposed in the hypothetical, referred to later as 
the “CASS Redistribution Model.” (See Figure 1.) Hereinafter, references to 
“K1,” “K2,” and so forth are references to the contracts shown on the diagram. 
                                                                                                                               
 49. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 50. Our focus in this article is on the impact of the fraud and abuse laws on Inbound Medical 
Tourism from Canada and on the means for minimizing such risk to encourage more U.S. providers 
to offer such services. However, we would be remiss in not at least acknowledging that U.S. pro-
viders are likely to raise concerns about how arrangements such as the one described in our hypo-
thetical affect their negligence, particularly professional negligence, risk. This raises issues such as 
whether a Canadian plaintiff may sue a U.S. provider at all, what law would be applied to such a 
suit, and the relative burden placed on a plaintiff facing a lawsuit outside his home country. For a 
discussion of professional negligence in the medical tourism context, see Browne et al., supra note 
30, at 324–47; Cohen, supra note 2, at 1494–1504. 
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Figure 1. Diagram of the CASS Redistribution Model 
 
A. Federal Laws  
 Any arrangement that involves the referral of patients by one individual to 
another for healthcare services financed by American Medicare, Medicaid, or 
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certain other U.S. federal healthcare programs must pass scrutiny under the fed-
eral Stark Law and the AKS.51 The proposed hypothetical involves no such fed-
erally financed services because OFP patients referred to CASS and ULAMC 
under the arrangement (including those associated with K1, K2 and K4) are Ca-
nadian citizens who reside in Canada, and thus are not and cannot be benefi-
ciaries of Medicare, Medicaid, or any other Federally Funded Healthcare 
Service.52 We thus can quickly conclude that the Stark Law and the AKS impose 
no prohibitions on Dave’s and Betsy’s proposed Inbound Medical Tourism 
model.53 
 On the other hand, we cannot so readily dismiss certain analogous state 
laws54 that apply to healthcare services funded by all sources, including the pa-
tients themselves. The remainder of this Part of the article will explore such 
laws. As we explain, the proposed model can nonetheless be structured to create 
minimal risk under those laws without diminishing the appeal of the arrange-
ment to the parties involved or diminishing the benefit the transactions other-
wise bring to the United States.  
 The parties could structure the arrangement to ensure no risk under state 
fraud and abuse laws if, for example, Dave and OFP merely referred their pa-
tients to CASS and ULAMC without any mutual covenants pertaining to fees, 
availability, or administrative obligations, such that CASS and ULAMC each 
simply billed its respective charges directly to, and collected from, the patients, 
with or without offering discounts or otherwise negotiating their fees. Such an 
arrangement would involve no exchange of money or other remuneration be-
tween OFP and CASS or between OFP and ULAMC and thus would not likely 
                                                                                                                               
 51. The federal Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits improper inducements to refer business to 
providers for any or all services that Medicare, Medicaid and other federal health programs (such 
as the Veteran’s Administration, CHAMPUS, and the Indian Health Services) pay for (hereafter, 
Federally Funded Healthcare Services). The Stark Law, on the other hand, prohibits certain referrals 
from physicians to providers of “Designated Health Services,” which is a list of specifically defined 
and enumerated services, which is a relatively small subset of Federally Funded Healthcare Services.  
 52. For purposes of this analysis, we will not address whether a dual citizen of both the United 
States and Canada, residing in Canada, may be an American Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary.  
 53. We acknowledge that Dr. Kim and her CASS colleagues will be entering into a financial 
arrangement with ULAMC as one piece of the proposed model. Because CASS refers patients other 
than OFC patients to ULAMC, some of which are federal healthcare program beneficiaries, such 
arrangement must comply with Stark, the AKS, and other relevant federal fraud and abuse laws. 
Further, because ULAMC is a nonprofit institution, this arrangement must also comply with appli-
cable federal and state tax-exemption laws with respect to transactions to which ULAMC is a party. 
For purposes of this article however, we make the assumption, without fear that it will not bear out, 
that the CASS-ULAMC relationship can and will be structured to comply with those laws and in a 
manner that does not have any substantial legal or practical impact on the other transactions de-
scribed in this article.  
 54. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 650–657 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Regular 
Session laws). Many other states have similar laws that would need to be analyzed with respect to 
any transactions where the providers are located in that state. But see infra note 56. We also do not 
address Canadian federal or provincial laws that may be applicable to these arrangements. Because 
we conclude that the proposed model will pass scrutiny under California law, which is quite broad 
in terms of its applicability to relationships between and among providers and lay entities, we will 
assume without analysis that the relationship would also pass scrutiny under similar Canadian laws.  
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implicate the AKS or any state law analogs. However, because the model’s suc-
cess depends, at least in part, on CASS’s and ULAMC’s agreement to discount 
their fees for OFP’s patients, and on the U.S. providers remaining available to 
provide the services and to work with OFP and its agents and employees in co-
ordinating and scheduling the services, CASS and ULAMC each must enter into 
financial relationships with OFP, and thus each must pass muster under appli-
cable California laws pertaining to financial arrangements involving healthcare 
providers.55 Dave’s proposal that the patients pay the full amount to CASS for 
the services (K4), after which CASS allocates and remits the appropriate 
amounts to ULAMC for the hospital services (K3) and to OFP for the adminis-
trative and travel services (K1), must also pass scrutiny under those laws. In 
summary, a triad of financial relationships must pass state-law muster—the re-
lationships between OFP and CASS (K1), between OFP and ULAMC (K2), and 
between CASS and ULAMC (K3). We turn to that analysis now. 
B. Applicable State Laws  
 Our proposed transaction could implicate two California statutes, the Cali-
fornia Anti-Kickback Statute (CAKS) (Bus. and Prof. Code 650) and Califor-
nia’s Health & Safety Code Section 445 (H&S 445), which we introduce and 
then apply to our hypothetical and proposed arrangement. The diagram in Figure 
1 shows the relationships between the parties in the proposed model to assist the 
reader in following the ensuing analysis. 
1. California’s Anti-Kickback Statute56 
 Unlike the federal AKS, which applies only to referrals for services reim-
bursed by federal government programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, the 
CAKS is broadly applicable to all healthcare services, regardless of payor 
source. It provides, in pertinent part: 
[Except with respect to certain intermediate and long-term care referral agen-
cies], the offer, delivery, receipt, or acceptance by any [licensed healthcare 
professional]57 of any rebate, refund, commission, preference, patronage divi-
dend, discount, or other consideration, whether in the form of money or other-
wise, as compensation or inducement for referring patients, clients, or 
customers to any person, irrespective of any membership, proprietary interest, 
                                                                                                                               
 55. CASS and ULAMC may or may not desire to enter into an agreement to set forth any 
terms that could be specific to the two in connection with the venture. Because any such arrangement 
would not, and indeed should not, include the exchange of remuneration, we need not analyze its 
compliance with California’s Anti-Kickback law. 
 56. Laws covering kickbacks vary from state to state, but we exclusively focus on the Cali-
fornia statute as a fifty-state survey of anti-kickback laws is beyond the scope of this article. As will 
become apparent in the remainder of this Section III.B, the applicable California laws prohibiting 
kickbacks in this context together constitute a very broad prohibition, making it valuable for anal-
ysis. While we cannot confirm without performing such a survey, we would predict that business 
arrangements passing muster under California’s laws are likely to be allowed under other states’ 
laws. 
 57. More specifically, the prohibition applies to “person licensed under [Division 5 of the 
Health and Safety Code (‘Healing Arts’)] or the Chiropractic Initiative Act.” § 650(a) (Westlaw). 
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or coownership in or with any person to whom these patients, clients, or cus-
tomers are referred is unlawful.58 
 Aside from being broader than the AKS in its applicability to all referrals 
without regard to payor source,59 the CAKS applies only when a licensed 
healthcare provider, such as a physician, dentist, or acupuncturist, is the inducer 
or the person induced (inducee), and in that respect is thus narrower than its 
federal counterpart.60 The person receiving the referral can be “any person” who 
provides the service, meaning the inducer or anyone else.  
2. California Health & Safety Code Section 445 (H&S 445) 
 In addition to implicating the CAKS, our hypothetical and proposed trans-
action also implicates H&S 445, which is similar to the CAKS:  
No person, firm, partnership, association or corporation, or agent or employee 
thereof, shall for profit refer or recommend a person to a physician, hospital, 
health-related facility, or dispensary for any form of medical care or treatment 
of any ailment or physical condition.61 
 H&S 445 is narrower than the CAKS in its applicability to treatment refer-
rals made only to physicians, hospitals, “health-related facilities” or dispensa-
ries, while the CAKS applies to referrals for services by “any person.” On the 
other hand, H&S 445 is broader than the CAKS in that the inducee (the entity 
who profits) can be anyone, where the inducee under the CAKS must be a li-
censed healthcare professional. Under both statutes, the entity making the re-
ferral (referrer) and the inducer can be anyone.  
 The CAKS is also broader than H&S 445 in its prohibition on mere “offers” 
of inducement and its applicability when an inducee merely accepts the induce-
ment, without regard to when, or even if, one of the things of value listed (the 
inducement) is actually delivered to the inducee. Under H&S 445 the referrer 
must “profit” from the referrer, meaning that the statute does not apply if the 
referrer merely accepts an offer of profit; arguably the inducer must have deliv-
ered the inducement to the referrer. Both statutes apply without regard to when, 
                                                                                                                               
 58. Id. 
 59. Under the federal analog:  
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration . . . in return for referring 
an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for 
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or. . . in return 
for purchasing, leasing, ordering . . . any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be 
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall be guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction thereof . . . . and  
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration . . . to any person to induce 
such person—(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing 
of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health 
care program, or (B) to purchase, lease, order . . . any good, facility, service, or item for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall be guilty of a 
felony . . . .  
42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 60. See § 650 (Westlaw). 
 61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 445 (West, Westlaw through all 2016 Regular Session 
laws). 
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or even if, the service is provided. There are numerous possible combinations 
of entities and persons acting as inducers. For example, there are attempting 
inducers (i.e., inducees who have accepted but not received the inducement); 
inducers who have received the inducement; and referrers. Some combinations 
would be prohibited under the CAKS and not H&S 445. Additionally, some 
combinations would be prohibited by both. Thus we cannot make a general 
statement about whether compliance with one of the statutes ensures compliance 
with the other.  
 However, for purposes of analyzing our hypothetical scenario, our pro-
posed structure will face the same negligible risk under both statutes because 
the two statutes prohibit the same conduct under the proposed arrangement (in-
ducing improper referrals and being induced to make such referrals), as long as 
the parties to the proposed transaction do not change. More specifically, under 
the CAKS, the risk is that CASS and ULAMC will be in a position to induce 
OFP and its physicians (licensed healthcare professionals) to refer patients to 
anyone, including CASS and ULAMC. Under H&S 445, the risk is that anyone, 
including CASS and ULAMC, will be in a position to induce referrals to OFP 
and its physicians (who belong to the subset of “physicians, hospitals, health 
facilities” and the like).62 Hereinafter, we refer to the CAKS and H&S 445 to-
gether as the California Anti-Kickback Laws (CAKL).63  
3. Analysis of Proposed Arrangement under California  
Anti-Kickback Laws 
 The proposed Inbound Medical Tourism model entails the establishment of 
financial relationships between all three healthcare providers, between OFP and 
CASS (K1), between OFP and ULAMC (K2) and between CASS and ULAMC 
(K3), each of which includes compensation terms and each of which thus must 
not run afoul of the CAKL. Further, Dave’s proposal for the cash to flow from 
the patients to CASS (K4), which then redistributes ULAMC’s and OFP’s por-
tions to them (K1 and K3), could be problematic under those laws, at least upon 
initial scrutiny, because that model—which we refer to hereinafter as the “CASS 
Redistribution Model”—requires one party (i.e., a provider, CASS), to redis-
tribute the total sum of money to others, including a referral source, OFP. Any 
such redistribution of proceeds, while not per se prohibited, must be approached 
very carefully to avoid the appearance of improper “fee splitting,” which the 
                                                                                                                               
 62. As explained earlier, supra Section IV.A.2, unlike H&S 445, CAKS also applies when 
inducers merely “offer” inducement and when inducees merely “accept” inducement, whereas under 
H&S 445, the parties are not in violation until the referrer has profited from the inducement. In that 
regard, our parties could face greater risk under CAKS because of the liability attaching at an earlier 
point in the process. However, we recommend our proposed structure with full recognition of those 
differences.  
 63. California law includes other statutes that prohibit kickbacks and remuneration for refer-
rals, but our hypothetical’s proposed transactions would not implicate any of them; such laws typi-
cally apply when specific payor sources are involved, such as Medicaid or workers’ compensation 
benefits. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.3 (Deering, LexisNexis through all 2016 legislation and 
propositions) (prohibiting improperly induced referrals of patients in the workers’ compensation 
context).  
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CAKL both prohibit.64 Even under the CASS Redistribution Model, however, 
the arrangement can be structured to incur minimal risk under those laws  
 The main goal of the OFP-CASS (K1) and OFP-ULAMC (K2) contracts is 
for CASS and ULAMC to promise to provide their respective services (surgery 
by CASS, hospitalization and ancillary services by ULAMC) to qualified OFP 
patients at prenegotiated rates and for OFP to ensure payment of fees in advance 
at such rates. Risk under the CAKL for both relationships would arise if any 
aspect of the compensation and services exchange could be construed as “com-
pensation or inducement” (under the CAKS) or as “profit” (under H&S 445) for 
OFP’s referral of patients to CASS or to ULAMC, respectively. For example, 
the CASS Redistribution Model—under which CASS, after collecting the total-
package fee from the patients, will pay OFP65 directly a fixed amount for each 
patient referred or a fixed percentage of the fee that CASS charges each referred 
patient—appears, at least on its face, to be a classic fee-splitting arrangement, 
which is highly suggestive that the compensation serves to induce OFP to refer 
patients to CASS and possibly to ULAMC.  
 However, because payment from CASS to OFP under the proposed ar-
rangement serves as compensation to OFP for performing certain specific ser-
vices, services that most substantially benefit the patients rather than the two 
providers, CASS is merely passing through to OFP the portion of the patients’ 
fees for OFP’s services. As long as such portion is consistent with the fair-
market value of OFP’s services, the payment is not simply a quid pro quo for 
OFP’s referrals and would not be improper under the CAKL, which do not pro-
hibit a party from compensating another for services as long as the compensa-
tion does not also serve to incentivize the service provider to refer patients. The 
amount for such services can be a fixed amount or can be based on a fixed per-
centage of the providers’ charges to the patient as long as the amount paid is 
consistent with the fair-market value of the services.66 
 Indeed, if the payment CASS remits to OFP were an amount equal to the 
fair-market value of the services that OFP provided to the patients only, and 
CASS were simply collecting such amount from the patients as a convenience 
to OFP, this would clearly not be an inducement for referrals, provided the value 
of CASS’s “collection and remittance” service is either negligible or included 
                                                                                                                               
 64. Fee splitting, whereby a provider pays part of the fee collected from the patient or payor 
source to the person who referred the patient, is merely one specific form of a kickback. While 
neither of the CAKLs include the words “fee,” “split,” or derivatives or combinations of those 
words, those statutes nonetheless prohibit the act commonly referred to as fee splitting. See CAL.  
CORP. CODE § 13408.5 (Deering, LexisNexis through all 2016 legislation and propositions).  
 65. CASS also pays ULAMC its portion of the total fee, but because ULAMC is not a referral 
source to CASS, this particular aspect of fee splitting is not relevant to that payment.  
 66. Indeed, the CAKS specifically and affirmatively permits a party to compensate another for 
services based on a percentage of the paying party’s total gross revenues, as long as the amount is 
consistent with the fair-market value of the services. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650(b) (West, 
Westlaw through all 2016 Regular Session laws) (“The payment or receipt of consideration for ser-
vices other than the referral of patients which is based on a percentage of gross revenue or similar 
type of contractual arrangement shall not be unlawful if the consideration is commensurate with the 
value of the services furnished . . . by the recipient to the payer.”). 
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in determining the amount remitted by CASS to OFP. In effect, CASS would 
not be paying any “compensation” to OFP, if compensation means payment for 
a service provided, and that aspect of the arrangement would not implicate the 
CAKL. CASS would simply be passing through from the patients to OFP an 
amount equal to OFP’s cost in providing the services to the patients, such as 
travel arrangements, fee-negotiations, communications with the U.S. providers 
on the patients’ behalf, the medical work up, and the like.  
 However, if the arrangement obligates OFP to provide any services at all 
to, or in favor of, CASS or ULAMC, which is likely to be the case, then the 
amount remitted from CASS to OFP must be determined to reflect the fair-
market value of such services. For example, if OFP is obligated under the ar-
rangement to act as the central scheduling coordinator for all of the patients un-
der the arrangement, thus simplifying the work that CASS and ULAMC would 
otherwise do by scheduling the services directly with each patient, then such 
service, which has a certain value, must be considered in the remittance amount 
to OFP. Another example may be that OFP is obligated to screen all the patients 
for certain medical conditions or to perform a more extensive workup on the 
patients than CASS or ULAMC would require of local referring physicians. If 
OFP incurred costs for providing those services, such as in the case where the 
patients would not pay for them—as is likely in a single-payor system such as 
Canada’s—such would also be services for which CASS and ULAMC would 
need to compensate OFP.  
 Nonetheless, because the CASS Redistribution Model appears outwardly to 
constitute a traditional fee-splitting arrangement under which a physician sends 
a cut of each referred patient’s fee to the referral source, the arrangement could 
be structured to avoid that appearance by instead obligating OFP to collect the 
full amount from the patients, after which OFP distributes CASS’s and 
ULAMC’s portions to them (hence eliminating K4, and adding OFP’s redis-
tribution obligations to K1 and K2). This “OFP Redistribution Model,” which 
shifts undesirably the administrative burden that Dave wanted to avoid back to 
OFP, would serve to remove CASS’s obligation to collect and then “split” and 
redistribute the fee to the referring provider. However, this approach is probably 
only slightly less likely to raise concerns under the CAKL, because simply 
shifting to the referral source, OFP, the obligation to collect and then split and 
redistribute the fee to the providers does very little to change the appearance that 
the total fee is being redistributed. Nonetheless, if structured to ensure that all 
payments made to each party are in amounts consistent with the fair-market 
value for the services provided by the recipient party, the OFP Redistribution 
Model would be at least as safe as the CASS Redistribution Model under the 
CAKL but without the unpleasant outward appearance of one provider splitting 
the fees and redistributing them to another provider and to a referral source. One 
party’s payment of amounts consistent with the fair-market value of the services 
provided by the party receiving the payment goes a long way to demonstrate 
that the arrangement is not an illegal kickback or fee split in disguise.67 
                                                                                                                               
 67. See Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 242 (Dec. 19, 1994). In that 
alert the Office of Inspector General explained: 
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 The cleanest approach legally, and the one most favorable from an admin-
istrative perspective for each of the three parties, would be for the patients to 
pay each of the three entities, CASS, ULAMC, and OFP, separately for their 
respective services. Such “Patient Direct Remittance Model,” however, would 
be much less appealing to the patients and thus may discourage them from 
seeking services under this model. Therefore, we think that because both the 
CASS Redistribution Model and the OFP Redistribution Model can be carefully 
structured and the fair-market value of the services can be adequately docu-
mented, as described above, they are not likely to create undue risk for liability 
and thus obviate the need to implement a Patient Direct Remittance Model. 68 
 Putting aside the nuances of the appearance of fee splitting among the par-
ties, when analyzing the actual economics of the payments and services, regard-
less of the specifics of how the money flows, the risk under the CAKL is still 
not zero, however, because the mere difference between the two providers’ non-
discounted rates and their discounted rates for OFP could be viewed as “com-
pensation or inducement” for OFP to refer its patients to CASS and ULAMC. 
As long as OFP passes all of that savings on to its patients, however, and does 
not retain a portion of the discount to cover its costs for providing the services 
it provides under the arrangement, OFP would not itself profit from CASS’s and 
ULAMC’s discounts. Without any profit from the discounts, it is unlikely that 
the discounts would be viewed as “compensation or inducement” for OFP to 
refer its patients to CASS and ULAMC.  
 An astute reader will remember, too, that our hypothetical specifically 
states that CASS is interested in entering into the arrangement with OFP to ob-
tain “an expanded referral base from OFP and the practice’s other colleagues in 
Toronto,”69 which certainly sounds on its face like it could be problematic under 
the CAKL. However, provided that the parties ensure that the discount (which 
would be the relevant and improper remuneration under a CAKL analysis) is 
passed on entirely to the patients, and does not benefit Dave or OFP other than 
                                                                                                                               
Whenever a [provider] offers or gives to a source of referrals anything of value not paid for at fair 
market value, the inference may be made that the thing of value is offered to induce the referral of 
business. The same is true whenever a referral source solicits or receives anything of value from the 
[provider]. By “fair market value” we mean value for general commercial purposes. However, “fair 
market value” must reflect an arms-length transaction which has not been adjusted to include the 
additional value which one or both of the parties has attributed to the referral of business between 
them. 
Id. § F. 
 68. Theoretically, even if the arrangement requires the patients to pay each of the three parties 
separately, either CASS or ULAMC could nonetheless game the arrangement to result in an im-
proper incentive to OFP. For example, CASS or ULAMC could, in collusion with OFP, offer even 
more substantially discounted fees to OFP’s patients while simultaneously turning a blind eye to 
OFP’s increase in its service fee to patients. The net result would be greater total remuneration to 
OFP, no change in what the patient pays, and a net decrease in what CASS or ULAMC collect, for 
which they expect even more referrals from OFP. As such, the respective agreements should further 
safeguard the arrangement by including covenants that OFP will only charge and collect fees for its 
services from patients that are commensurate with the fair-market value for those services. As an 
additional precaution, OFP and ULAMC should consider including documentation in their files of 
OFP’s fair-market value analysis for the fees it charges to patients.  
 69. See supra Part II. 
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indirectly by incentivizing patients to seek out their services, we would not be 
concerned about the risk in that regard. Further, CASS’s intent in providing the 
discount is to be able to offer better prices to Canadians, for whose business it 
would be competing with other, much less expensive nations.  
 The preceding analysis did not discuss in detail the relationship between 
OFP and ULAMC. We would anticipate that those parties will enter into a 
written agreement with each other to set forth the analogous terms and condi-
tions relevant to the relationship between OFP and CASS (K2). If, for example, 
OFP provides similar services for ULAMC as those it provides to CASS, such 
as scheduling coordination, and if the arrangement is implemented under one of 
the two Redistribution Models, CASS or OFP will remit a portion of the fee 
collected from patients to ULAMC. Such terms must be memorialized in 
writing, and the financial components must pass muster under the CAKL. Pur-
suant to the same analysis as the relationship between OFP and CASS under the 
CASS Redistribution Model, the financial relationship between OFP and 
ULAMC should comply with the CAKL under the OFP Redistribution Model 
as long as the amount retained by OFP before paying ULAMC is consistent with 
the fair-market value for OFP’s services. If the arrangement is structured to re-
quire the patients to pay all three providers separately, as under the Patient Di-
rect Admittance Model, then OFP will make no payment to ULAMC, and we 
thus need not be concerned about the OFP-ULAMC relationship’s compliance 
with the CAKL.70  
 If a lay medical tourism broker were substituted for OFP in our hypothet-
ical, the legal risk would be increased to the extent that the broker makes a profit 
rather than simply being compensated for the fair-market value of the services 
it is providing to the patients and CASS/ULAMC. Because typically lay brokers 
are for-profit entities and thus would seek to receive more than simply the fair-
market value of their services with no markup, we advise providers seeking to 
reduce their potential liability under the CAKL to avoid these types of arrange-
ments. 
 We need not further analyze the arrangements between OFP and the pa-
tients (K6) or between OFP and any subcontracted travel service (K5) under the 
CAKL because they do not involve patient referrals. Those contracts are neces-
sary simply to effectuate the model from a business perspective, so that, for ex-
ample, the patients become obligated to receive services from OFP in 
connection with the procedure and to pay CASS directly for the services pro-
vided by all three healthcare providers.  
 The CAKL are not the only potentially applicable state-level statutes, how-
ever. California also has an analogous statute to the federal Stark Law. 
                                                                                                                               
 70. All three models—the CASS Redistribution Model, the OFP Redistribution Model, and 
the Patient Direct Remittance Model—are subject to the same theoretical limitation as that described 
in supra note 66, so long as the parties colluded to intentionally restructure the economics of the 
arrangement so that one party ends up receiving compensation that is greater than the fair-market 
value of the services such party provides, even if the patients pay the same as they would under a 
compliant model.  
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4. California’s Self-Referral Prohibition 
 California’s Physician Ownership and Referral Act (PORA), also known as 
the “Speier” Law, is the California analog to the Stark law and prohibits physi-
cians from referring patients to any person for certain specific, mostly ancillary 
services, such as laboratory, diagnostic nuclear medicine, radiation oncology, 
and physical therapy services (PORA-Covered Services),71 if the physician or a 
member of the physician’s immediate family has a financial interest with the 
person or in the entity that receives the referral.72 As with the CAKL, the Cali-
fornia anti-kickback analogs to the federal AKS, PORA’s prohibitions apply to 
referrals for services funded by any source, not just Medicare, Medicaid, or 
other federal programs. On the other hand, PORA is much narrower than the 
Stark Law in its applicability to referrals for a smaller subset of services, which, 
most notable for our purposes, excludes a physician’s referrals to a hospital for 
any type of service, even those listed above, as long as the hospital simply “does 
not compensate the [physician] for the referral.”73  
 PORA only applies to referrals from physicians who are in a financial rela-
tionship with an entity to whom the physician refers patients for one or more of 
the enumerated services.74 OFP will have a financial relationship with CASS, 
but that relationship will not be subject to PORA because OFP is referring its 
patients to CASS primarily for surgical services, which are not subject to PORA.  
 On the other hand, CASS may occasionally provide a PORA-Covered Ser-
vice, and OFP’s financial relationship with ULAMC will entail OFP’s and 
CASS’s referrals to ULAMC for hospital services, which undoubtedly will in-
clude ancillary services, such as laboratory and x-ray services, all of which are 
PORA-Covered Services. Even if we presume that the California agencies that 
enforce PORA would take the position that OFP physicians are subject to 
PORA, notwithstanding that they are not California “licensees” and notwith-
standing their physical presence outside California,75 the relationships between 
                                                                                                                               
 71. The other PORA-Covered Services are: physical rehabilitation, psychometric testing, 
home infusion therapy and diagnostic imaging goods or services. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
650.01(a) (West, Westlaw through all 2016 Regular Session laws). 
 72. Id. § 650.02(a). 
 73. Id. § 650.02(c)(1). 
 74. Id. § 650.01(a) (making it “unlawful for a licensee to refer a person for [PORA-Covered 
Services] if the licensee or his or her immediate family has a financial interest with the person or in 
the entity that receives the referral”).  
 75. We acknowledge that even if OFP remains insulated from prosecution under PORA, or if 
the referrals from OFP did run afoul of PORA, CASS and ULAMC could face direct liability under 
PORA because they are prohibited from seeking reimbursement for any services they provide pur-
suant to an improper referral from OFP. Id. § 650.01(d) (“No claim for payment shall be presented 
by an entity to any individual, third party payer, or other entity for a good or service furnished 
pursuant to a referral prohibited under this section.”). Because we are structuring the arrangement 
to ensure compliance with PORA as if OFP were prosecutable under the statute, we are not con-
cerned about its liability, except to the extent CASS and ULAMC should be aware of it. Notwith-
standing whether OFP is insulated from prosecution under PORA for a misdemeanor (see id. § 
650.01(g)), CASS and ULAMC also could theoretically be subject to scrutiny under PORA as aiders 
or abettors of the crime committed by OFP. We are not aware of any such prosecutions, successful 
or otherwise, but the attorneys for the parties to the transactions should inform their clients about 
this possibility.  
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OFP and CASS and between OFP and ULAMC will easily pass muster under 
PORA as long as they are structured such that no element of the remuneration 
exchanged serves to “compensate the physician for the referral.” As explained 
above, CASS and ULAMC will each be compensating OFP at fair-market value 
for a small amount of administrative services that OFP provides under the pro-
posed arrangement. Aside from that, ULAMC’s principal obligation will be to 
provide services to OFP’s patients in return, under either of the Redistribution 
Models, for CASS’s or OFP’s obligation to pay ULAMC hospital in advance 
for the services at the agreed upon rate, and ULAMC’s obligations will be to 
provide the hospital services according to the terms set forth in the agreement.76 
Under the Patient Direct Remittance Model, OFP would not be receiving any 
compensation or anything else of value from a referring entity, other than the 
opportunity to develop a resource that will provide more affordable services to 
its patients. Thus, the arrangements carry little or no risk under PORA.77 
V. LEGAL CHANGES  
TO ENCOURAGE MEDICAL TOURISM 
 Perhaps the most administratively simple way to achieve the goals of the 
proposed Inbound Medical Tourism arrangement is for the patient to pay one 
fee to either CASS or ULAMC, which then compensates OFP for its services as 
the medical tourism broker. However, relevant state laws, in California and else-
where, are likely to, at least initially, view such an arrangement with suspicion 
under existing state anti-kickback laws, as demonstrated above. 
 All risk under these state laws can be avoided by having the patient make 
separate payments to the two providers and the broker for their individual ser-
vices, so long as OFP does not negotiate discounts from CASS or ULAMC for 
the OFP patients. This is the traditional referral model, where a medical provider 
refers its patients to a surgeon and a hospital with no contractual arrangement 
among these parties. However, such an arrangement does not always accom-
plish the provider’s goals. Here, Dave wants to negotiate a set discount for his 
patients to enable lower-income patients to obtain needed medical care in the 
United States. As discussed above, by ensuring that any fee OFP receives is 
based on the fair-market value of the services it is providing, and by passing 
along all of the discounts to its patients, the risk under relevant California laws 
can be minimized but not completely eliminated. The three Models we have set 
forth provide structures to accomplish this reduction in liability. However, U.S. 
                                                                                                                               
 76. CASS and its California-licensed physicians are directly subject to PORA with respect to 
any referrals they make, to ULAMC or otherwise, for any PORA-Covered Services, and CASS will 
be making such referrals of OFP patients to ULAMC for laboratory, x-ray and other PORA-Covered 
Services during the admissions. However, as with any other financial relationship between CASS 
and ULAMC, such as any medical directorships or call coverage arrangements between them, they 
can easily be structured to avoid scrutiny under PORA, most typically under PORA’s personal ser-
vices exception. See id. § 650.01(b)(6). PORA also provides an exception permitting physicians to 
refer patients to their own group practices. See id. § 650.02(f). As such, the CASS physicians will 
be able to refer OFP patients to either ULAMC or to CASS for laboratory, x-ray and other services 
that might otherwise be prohibited, without fear of noncompliance with PORA.  
 77. But see supra note 75. 
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providers would surely prefer to have potential liability for Inbound Medical 
Tourism eliminated, not simply reduced. 
 Before proposing changes to the existing law, we must consider the policy 
rationale for anti-kickback laws and self-referral prohibitions. Legislators and 
regulatory agencies are unlikely to enact any changes that run counter to these 
policies. While it may seem obvious, anti-kickback laws and self-referral prohi-
bitions are designed to ensure that healthcare providers make only appropriate, 
nonfinancially incentivized referrals based solely on clinical considerations. If 
a provider receives a payment for making a referral, the fear is that the provider 
may be financially motivated to (1) refer a patient to a less-than-qualified pro-
vider or (2) refer a patient for services the patient does not truly need.78 Pre-
venting both protects patients.  
 Under our hypothetical scenario, OFP arguably could be financially incen-
tivized to refer patients to CASS and ULAMC even if another provider would 
be more appropriate, given the written arrangements among these three parties. 
This is perhaps compounded by the family relationship between Dave and 
Betsy, but is lessened somewhat by the esteem in which CASS and ULAMC are 
held by their U.S. peers and in the additional work OFP is undertaking to facil-
itate the referrals. Arguably, OFP could actually face a disincentive to refer to 
CASS and ULAMC, given the additional work required to make the needed 
arrangements and the lack of profit to OFP from the arrangement under any of 
our three models.  
 Further, without some compensation for the time OFP will spend adminis-
tering the referrals to CASS and ULAMC, OFP arguably will actually face a 
disincentive to negotiate the discounts that will enable more patients to receive 
care at CASS and ULAMC, leading to decreased access to such services. Fur-
thermore, OFP will not be paid simply for referring patients, but instead will 
receive compensation for actual additional services it is performing on behalf of 
its patients, further lessening the concern. 
 In addition, because of the considerable cost to obtain medical services in 
the United States and because the patients have already been diagnosed with a 
condition for which they could seek care in Canada, the policy concern of in-
centivizing medically unnecessary referrals is lessened, as patients are unlikely 
to spend their own funds to obtain care unless they are dramatically impacted 
by their medical condition and in great need of medical care. 
 While the proposed arrangement can be structured to create minimal risk of 
liability under the California statutes, formally eliminating this risk would not 
be much of a stretch. As the federal AKS and Stark laws have done for such 
risk-prone relationships as medical directorships, California could create a 
                                                                                                                               
 78. Spece, supra note 30, at 15. Spece recognized that these laws also prevent against  
(1) paying windfalls to referring physicians . . . (3) increasing the cost of care . . . (5) encouraging 
providers who pay referral fees to cut corners in their care to recoup the costs of referral fees; (6) 
commodifying patients and commercializing and debasing providers; (7) undercutting societal and 
individual patient trust in providers; and (8) creating poorer patient outcomes because of the attenu-
ation of trust. 
Id. 
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formal safe harbor under the CAKS, H&S 445 or both and a formal exception 
under PORA for medical tourism arrangements similar to those we have pro-
posed, which, if followed, will absolutely protect the providers from liability 
under state law.  
 Such a safe harbor under the CAKL could be a standalone statement like 
the other CAKS safe harbors79 and thus take the following form: 
An arrangement under which a provider remits a portion of a fee it collects 
from a patient to a provider located outside California or to a broker located 
outside California, where such out-of-California provider or broker arranges 
administrative or travel services for patients to travel to the California provider 
for medical services, and where such portion of such fee is consistent with fair-
market value for the services provided by the out-of-California provider or 
broker, and pursuant to a written arrangement between and among the parties, 
shall not be deemed to violate this Section [650] [445]. 
 The PORA exception would be worded almost identically, except that, be-
cause the lead-in language for the PORA exceptions states that “[t]he prohibi-
tion of [PORA] shall not apply to or restrict any of the following,” we would 
simply delete the last phrase above, “shall not be deemed to violate this Section 
[650] [445],” to make the exception conform to the PORA grammatic structure. 
Legislators also could make a policy decision on whether to permit payment of 
a portion of the fee to any broker, or limit allowed direct payments to those made 
to other medical professionals or medical practices, as we have done in our hy-
pothetical. 
 This proposed CAKL safe harbor and PORA exception would permit CASS 
or ULAMC to collect the entire fee from the patients in our hypothetical, and 
then pay OFP a reasonable fee based on the fair-market value of the services 
that OFP provides in administering the arrangement, without fear of legal lia-
bility or regulatory scrutiny in California.  
 
 U.S. medical providers seeking to provide medical care to foreign citizens 
face an uncertain regulatory environment at the state level, which undoubtedly 
discourages participation in the more innovative financial arrangements be-
coming common in medical tourism worldwide. We have exemplified an In-
bound Medical Tourism arrangement using California law under which 
providers may significantly reduce, but not entirely eliminate, liability under the 
state equivalents of the federal AKS and Stark law. The referring physician or 
group under such arrangement acts as the medical tourism broker or facilitator. 
Such physician or group may even be compensated for its services, so long as 
the compensation is documented to reflect the fair-market value of the services, 
and the broker does not retain any discounts it negotiates with the service pro-
                                                                                                                               
 79. CAKS provides certain safe harbors and exceptions; H&S 445 does not. § 650.02 
(Westlaw); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 445 (West, Westlaw through all 2016 Regular Session 
laws). 
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viders but instead passes them along to the patients. This structure has the addi-
tional advantage of shifting responsibility for identifying appropriate cases for 
referral and for ensuring that the patients are properly prepared for surgery from 
a medical perspective from a lay broker to a physician. 
 State legislators and regulators should review the benefits that attracting 
additional medical tourists to U.S. hospitals can provide not only to the medical 
providers, but to the community at large, and consider whether the patient pro-
tection policy goals of laws restricting referrals and kickbacks can be maintained 
while providing a safe harbor permitting a wider range of financial arrangements 
with medical tourism brokers to encourage increased medical tourism. Encour-
aging medical tourists, particularly Canadians, to seek care in U.S. hospitals can 
be a win-win situation for medical providers and their communities, while per-
haps serving also to incentivize the tourists’ home countries to ameliorate the 
problems that led their citizens to seek care elsewhere. 
